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ABSTRACT 
 
This article focuses on the commercialization of urban water services in 
Zambia. It aims to demonstrate the tension between cost recovery and 
service extension when water sector reforms combine investment cuts with 
price increases. It is argued that in low-income economies where 
infrastructure limitations are serious and poverty is widespread, heavy 
reliance on ‘tariff rationalization’ with low levels of investment can lead to 
reduced access to water and render water charges unaffordable. Reforms to 
public services can prove futile in the absence of upfront resources for 
investment in the restoration and extension of the existing infrastructure. In 
many ways, Zambia typifies other low-income economies; this study thus 
offers useful lessons for them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Halving the estimated 1.1 billion people without access to safe drinking water by 
2015 is one of the Millennium Development Goals. At the current rate of progress it 
is unlikely that this target will be achieved in many parts of the developing world. 
According to the most recent Human Development Report, 2040 is a more likely date 
for this goal to be reached in Africa unless there is accelerated investment in the 
sector (UNDP, 2006). 
A water sector crisis in Africa followed the recessionary conditions of the 1970s, 
when many suppliers found themselves in a financial vicious circle caused by a 
decline in government funding of capital expenditure, low tariffs, low billing, low 
revenue collections and increasing demand for water (Shirley, 2002). The neoliberal 
solution to problems in the water sector has been privatization. However, the 
experiments of more than a decade have shown that privatization of water services 
was a poor policy prescription, involving ‘spectacular failures’ in the words of UNDP 
(2006: 92). Problems have been associated with the difficulty of establishing 
competitive market structures (Estache et al., 2005; Kessides, 2004; Kirkpatrick et al., 
2006), ineffectiveness of regulation in the presence of information asymmetries and 
incomplete contracts (Martimort, 2006), and negative welfare effects (Bayliss, 2003; 
Dagdeviren, 2006; Ugaz and Price, 2003). Over the years, the confidence of the 
public in the benefits of utility privatization and that of the private sector in the 
profitability of developing country utilities, especially water, have dwindled. Private 
investment in infrastructure projects has declined and many existing private 
operations have been subject to re-negotiation (Hall and Lobina, 2004; Harris, 2003).  
 In many low-income economies, investment needs in the water sector are colossal 
and the affordability of rising water tariffs is usually a problem. Hence, neither full 
privatization, nor public–private partnerships which do not involve substantial 
transfers from the public sector, are attractive for the multinational investors who 
dominate the water sector (Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2006; Lobina, 2005). As a result, 
the commercialization of services under public corporations has become the de facto 
policy in many countries such as Zambia. Indeed, current trends in the low-income 
economies are increasingly being determined by corporatization of existing public 
suppliers and commercialization of services (Estache et al., 2005; Prasad, 2006; 
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Smith, 2006). This is sometimes used as an intermediate step before further 
privatization, as in the case of water supply in Lusaka.  
 The stated aims of commercialization in the water sector are cost recovery and 
improved access to water (McDonald, 2002). Apart from organizational changes (the 
creation of commercial utilities and their separation from the municipal authorities, 
introduction of regulatory mechanisms, etc.), under the new framework suppliers are 
required to improve their billing and revenue collection rates, reduce overstaffing and 
rationalize tariffs in an effort to achieve full cost recovery. In practice, in low-income 
countries enduring a prolonged period of economic austerity, the commercialization 
of water services has been an instrument for governments to relinquish their 
responsibility for funding investments in network expansion. While, in general, water 
sector reforms for improving efficiency, service quality and access are welcome, 
heavy reliance on tariff rationalization without paying much attention to investment 
and maintenance needs could be a serious problem. 
This article aims to demonstrate that cost recovery through corporatization of 
suppliers and commercialization of services is likely to be unattainable under 
conditions of serious infrastructure limitations (such as a small and ageing network) 
when reforms are based on tariff rationalization and cuts in capital expenditure. This 
strategy creates a sequence of problems such as unaffordable water tariffs, reduced 
access to water and greater inefficiency. It is argued that up-front investment for the 
renewal and extension of the existing infrastructure is likely to be more effective in 
reducing the costs of maintenance and ‘unaccounted for water’ and making better use 
of economies of scale in the sector.  
The discussion is based on, and supported by, a case study of urban water 
services in Zambia. The characteristics of Zambia and its water sector in many ways 
typify those of other low-income economies with, for example, high levels of 
poverty, limited access to water and a crumbling water network in the urban centres. 
Hence, its experience with commercialization and the lessons associated with it 
should be highly relevant elsewhere. After setting out the background and context of 
water sector reforms in Zambia, the article assesses the impact of water sector 
commercialization in terms of current cost-recovery levels by the ten urban water 
utilities operating in Zambia, the affordability of water charges, and the access rates 
to urban water supply. The outcomes are then evaluated with an emphasis on the need 
for prioritizing investment in the sector. 
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COMMERCIALIZATION OF PUBLIC WATER SERVICES IN ZAMBIA 
 
Zambia was a middle-income country at independence in 1964. Its fortunes changed 
drastically in the 1970s with the decline in the terms of trade of its principal output 
and export, copper. Since then, economic decline has affected every development 
parameter. Per capita incomes fell from US$ 752 in 1965 to US$ 351 in 2002. It is 
one of the most indebted countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Life expectancy droppped 
from fifty-one years in 1982 to just thirty-seven years in 2002, the lowest in Africa 
(World Bank, 2005). According to the Living Conditions and Monitoring Survey 
(LCMS) 2002–03, the country suffers from high levels of poverty and inequality with 
a headcount ratio of 68 per cent and Gini coefficient of 0.61 (Central Statistical 
Office, 2004).  
Prior to the 1990s, municipal authorities were responsible for the operation and 
delivery of urban water and sanitation. The infrastructure was owned, maintained and 
extended by the central government. A different arrangement existed in the 
Copperbelt where Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines owned and operated the water 
network and supplied water to the mines, its employees and other residents in the 
mine townships. Water tariffs in all the urban centres of Zambia were heavily 
subsidized. Charges were paid as part of rents and were mostly unnoticed by users.  
Economic decline took its toll on essential services, including water supply. The 
crisis in the sector deepened when financial bottlenecks facing the municipal 
operators — which arose from low billing and low revenue collection — were 
accompanied by cuts in central government funding following a general economic 
deterioration after the 1970s. This meant that access to water by the urban population 
could not be extended; in fact, it has declined slightly since the early 1990s. As 
discussed below the small size of the system and the ageing infrastructure in many 
urban centres have inflated the unit cost of accounted water, partly through rising 
‘unaccounted for’ water rates over time . The policy of cost recovery under such 
conditions has had negative implications for water tariffs, as reflected in Table A1 in 
the Appendix.  
Reform initiatives in the sector were considered as early as 1976 and continued 
into the 1980s. Most notable were the reforms aimed at commercialization and 
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attempts at privatization: pilot schemes started with the water supply and sanitation 
system in Lusaka in 1989 and in Eastern Province in 1992, and similar programmes 
followed in other provinces after 2000. The process involved a number of legislative 
and institutional changes from 1992 to 2000, including the establishment of a 
regulatory authority, the National Water and Sanitation Council (NWASCO). The 
core objective of commercialization has been to achieve cost recovery in water 
services. While water companies have been required to improve their operational 
efficiency (billing and collections) for this purpose, the emphasis of the reform 
process which started in 1992 has been on increasing tariffs.  
As of November 2006, there were ten commercial water and sanitation 
companies (WSCs) in the major urban centres of Zambia, which contain 90 per cent 
of the country’s urban population.1 Each WSC has a regional or provincial monopoly 
in water supply and distribution. As municipal governments are the sole shareholders 
in WSCs, they appoint the Boards of Directors, which recruit and oversee the 
performance of senior management of the companies.  
Privatization, although permitted by the 1997 water and sanitation act, did not 
feature in the process of restructuring water services; except for a management 
contract awarded in the mining towns of the Copperbelt, the most financially viable 
service area. The implementation of the contract was only possible with a World 
Bank loan to the government to cover various expenses, including management fees 
and network rehabilitation.2 Even then, the contract was terminated in 2005 on the 
grounds that the privatized management did not perform any better than publicly 
owned utilities. The service responsibility was transferred to another public utility in 
the province, Nkana WSC. 
One of the positive developments in the sector since the inception of the reforms 
is the role played by the regulatory body, NWASCO (World Bank, 2004). More 
information is now publicly available about the operation and performance of 
commercial WSCs than about municipal providers and water schemes developed by 
the NGOs, which were not subject to independent regulation until 2005. Since then, 
NGO schemes are also covered in the regulator’s annual reports, which detail 
companies’ progress in performance and identify their weaknesses. These annual 
                                                 
1 As of 2006, a further twenty-two municipal centres were yet to organize their water and 
sanitation services along commercial lines. 
2 The contract was awarded to AHC MMS, a local subsidiary of SAUR. 
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reports seem to have fostered ‘yardstick competition’ and brought some dynamism 
into the sector. The availability of information on comparative performance seems to 
be forcing companies to take remedial actions and to improve their service delivery. 
Independent water-watch groups are also emerging to raise the awareness of users 
about their rights and develop a capacity for dealing with concerns and complaints 
about water companies. 
 
 
IMPACTS OF COMMERCIALIZATION OF URBAN WATER SERVICES IN 
ZAMBIA 
 
Cost Recovery in Commercial Public Utilities 
 
The interpretation of the success or failure of the commercialization process in the 
water sector in terms of cost recovery3 depends on the method of assessment and 
indicators used. For example, comparisons between the commercial public utilities 
and local authority suppliers indicate that the performance of the latter group is 
inferior in terms of revenue collection and cost recovery (NWASCO, 2006). This is 
confirmed by MLGH (2004), which clearly shows that the public commercial utilities 
generate more revenues and achieve better cost recovery. Comparisons amongst the 
ten commercial utilities show great variation in cost recovery levels (Table 1). Some, 
like Kafubu WSC, are much closer to recovering their costs, while others, like 
Northwestern WSC, lag well behind.  
Short-term comparisons yield different results than long-term ones. For 
example, focusing on performance from 2000 onwards — when most of the 
commercial utilities were established — would indicate that there have been 
improvements on some fronts such as bill collection and cost recovery (Table 1) and 
metering (NWASCO, 2005). Yet, even with a short-term focus, it is clear that most 
utility companies were far from achieving full recovery of their operational and 
maintenance costs after 2001 (Table 1) despite the fact that water tariffs have 
increased significantly in real terms. For example, fixed monthly charges for low-cost 
                                                 
3 In this article, cost recovery is measured as the ratio of collections to the operational and 
maintenance costs. 
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housing categories, which apply to the majority of the urban population in Zambia, 
have increased two to seven-fold in real terms since 1990 (see Table 2).  
 
 
Table 1. Selected Indicators of Cost Recovery (%)  
 
Water 
Companies 
 
Collection to 
billing ratio 
 
 
Collection to 
cost ratioa 
 
 
Unaccounted 
for water 
 
 
 
 
Tariff to 
unit 
cost 
ratio 
 
 
 
Unit 
cost 
US$/m3 
 
2005 2001 2005 2001 2005 2001 2002 2002 
Lusaka  77 56 75 73 56 58 81 0.31 
Former 
AHC-MMS 82 70 71 50 32 51 54 0.28 
Mulonga 58 34 59 48 61 57 108 0.13 
Kafubu 65 31 95 38 57 50 57 0.2 
Nkana 81 44 76 44 45 59 99 0.2 
Southern 57 51 65 78 56 52 81 0.21 
Western 76 68 61 53 44 67 123 0.08 
Northwestern 94 86 52 47 45 40 42 0.36 
Chambeshi 76 – 36  – 60 – – – 
Chipata 81 99 79 108 29 25 107 0.36 
Weighted 
Average 75  60 67 – 49 51 – – 
 
Note: 
a: Costs include cost of operations and maintenance. 
Source: Own estimates based on data from NWASCO 2002, 2003 and 2005 
 
 
The process of commercialization, however, did not start in 2000 but in the late 
1980s with the commercialization of water supply services in  Lusaka in 1989, tariff 
increases from 1992 onwards and a series of legal changes. In the 1980s, the 
government had already started searching for ways to improve financial performance 
in the water and sanitation sector. A major study was funded by the government, the 
World Bank and the UNDP and undertaken by a private consultancy firm, Coopers 
and Lybrand Co., to assess the issues in the water and sanitation sector and inform the 
government about the possible reform strategies. The study found that the revenues of 
urban suppliers covered 83 per cent of total operational and maintenance costs in 
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1987 (Coopers and Lybrand, 1988). When this is compared to the average cost 
recovery of 67 per cent in 2005 (see Table 1) it becomes pertinent to ask what has 
gone wrong in the process of commercialization.   
Apart from the fact that each water and sanitation company has a different cost 
structure,4 the failure to cover costs after the commercialization of water services and 
variations in performance can largely be explained by two factors. First, and perhaps 
most important, all existing providers suffer from high levels of unaccounted for 
water (UFW) that make cost recovery a mission impossible. UFW reflects the 
difference between the amount of water produced and the amount that is billed. Since 
2001, the weighted average of UFW rates have remained around 50 per cent; in 1987, 
before commercialization started, this rate was around 28 per cent (Coopers and 
Lybrand, 1988). 
With the exception of Chipata WSC, utilities that made some progress in this 
respect still have very high UFW rates (see Table 1). The most important causes of 
UFW are leakages in the system, due to lack of maintenance and poor infrastructure, 
and water wastage as a result of unmeasured consumption coupled with fixed 
payments. Sector specialists and company annual reports also mention vandalism, 
ineffective accounting and monitoring of customer databases as reasons for UFW 
(AHC-MMS, 2002, 2003; Nkana WSC, 2003). Given the variety of reasons for high 
UFW rates, the solutions have to involve a multi-faceted approach. However, the key 
to all solutions is investment, in repairs and maintenance, in renewing and extending 
the network, in metering, in systems of monitoring and in human resources.  
Second, although the number of bills collected by the utilities since 2001 has 
increased, on average 25 per cent of the billed amount still remained uncollected in 
2005 (Table 1). Some companies such as Mulonga and Western WSCs had high 
enough tariffs to cover the unit cost of supply, but were unable to break even because 
of uncollected bills. Non-payment by both residential customers and government 
institutions is a serious problem leading to high levels of arrears. Some companies 
disconnect domestic users with high arrears.5 In Lusaka, government institutions 
consumed around 50 per cent of the water supply as of 2005 but paid off only a small 
                                                 
4 This is because physical conditions of water production, the state of infrastructure, wages 
and salaries,  sanitation coverage  etc.  differ from one utility to another. For example, 
distance from the network and the source of water influence the energy costs of pumping. 
5 AHC-MMS, for example carried out 13721 disconnections during 2002–03 (AHC-MMS, 
2003). 
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proportion of their accumulated debt. The ‘bad debt’ provisions, which reflect the 
level of arrears in payments, amounted to 25–30 per cent of the collected revenues in 
the annual reports of Lusaka, AHC-MMS and Nkana in 2002. Problems in the 
administrative capacity of water and sanitation companies6 also contribute to low 
revenue collection. 
Taking these two factors together implies that the water utilities earned 
revenues for only 37.5 per cent of their production on average in 2005, since half of 
the water they produced was not billed and a quarter of the billed amount was not 
collected.  
 
 
Affordability of Water Tariffs  
 
In Zambia, households have been charged for water according to the housing 
category they occupy. Families in low-cost housing pay less than those in medium 
and high-cost housing. Those who use public tap pay the least. Due to limited 
metering of domestic connections, most users pay a flat or fixed monthly rate, 
irrespective of the quantity of water they consume.  
The commercialization of water tariffs started in the early 1990s. Between 1992 
and 1994, the fixed charges for unmetered residential connections more than doubled 
for medium-cost housing and more than quadrupled for low and high-cost housing in 
real terms.7 The new tariffs soon became politically untenable and the government 
had to lower them. Since the mid 1990s, and especially after the establishment of new 
commercial utilities from 2000 onwards, there have been further adjustments to water 
tariffs.  
 
 
Table 2. Increases in Monthly Water Charges for Selected Utilities (%)  
 
Unmetered (1990–2006) 
 
Metered (1992–2006)  
 
 
Low-cost 
housing 
Mid-cost 
housing  
High cost 
housing  6m3 15m3 30m3 
Lusaka 461.7 289.6 831.2 Lusaka 153.7 610.2 880.8 
                                                 
6 For example, problems with creating and updating customer databases, developing effective 
payment systems, and following up on unpaid bills. 
7 The absolute values of water charges over time are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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Nkana  214.8 75.1 277.2 Nkana  153.7 572.2 869.5 
Southern 222.8 61.7 158.7 Southern 153.7 534.1 773.7 
Western 707.1 – 250.3 Western 153.7 591.2 910.4 
 
Source: Estimated using tariff data by Ministry of Energy and Water Development for the  
1990s and by NWASCO for more recent years. Estimates are based on constant prices. 
 
 
The increase in monthly water charges (in constant prices) for selected utilities is 
presented in Table 2.8 In comparison with 1990 (that is, prior to commercialization), 
the escalation in water charges in 2006 was much greater for the low-cost housing 
category than for the medium-cost category for all utilities, and greater than the high-
cost category for some utilities. Nkana WSC reduced water charges for medium and 
low-cost housing in 2006, after taking over the most financially viable company, 
AHC-MMS, which supplied the mines in the Copperbelt. Charges for metered 
connections have been much lower for small consumption (up to 15 cubic meters) 
than fixed charges for unmetered connections (see Appendix Table A1). In fact, 
having metered connections would have halved the water bill of the families in low-
cost housing with a consumption of less than 15 m3 per month in 2002, and reduced it 
by between 20 and 66 per cent in 2006. This pricing strategy has been a means of 
revenue maximization for commercial utilities with the task of cost recovery, since a 
large proportion of the urban population occupy low-cost housing9 and most 
connections are not metered.10 In spite of the successive real increases, water charges 
applied by Zambian utilities are still the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa (Ballance and 
Tremolet, 2005). Yet, the affordability of current tariffs continues to be a problem.  
 In the literature, one of the most frequently used methods for assessing the 
affordability of water tariffs involves a benchmark ratio of household water 
expenditure to household income. The World Bank uses a benchmark set by the Pan-
American Health Organization, that households should spend no more than 5 per cent 
of their monthly income on water (World Bank, 2001). In the UK, the government 
considers water tariffs to be unaffordable if expenditure exceeds 3 per cent of 
household income, which is twice the current median spending ratio on water in the 
                                                 
8 Lusaka and Nkana (after taking over AHC-MMS) are the largest water and sanitation 
companies in the country in terms of the water produced. Southern WSC is of medium size 
and Western WSC is one of the smallest utilities. 
9 According to Central Statistical Office (2004), around 80 per cent of the urban population 
lives in low-cost housing. 
10 According to NWASCO (2005), the metering rate is below 40 per cent for all water 
companies, except for Nkana and Chipata. 
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country (Sawkins and Dickie, 2005). A recent Human Development Report (UNDP, 
2006) also suggests that no household should spend more than 3 per cent of its 
income on water.  
Although this method may appear rather arbitrary, it can be applied in countries 
where data limitations prevail, and the results often provide valuable insights. Other 
methods used in the literature, such as revealed or stated preferences approaches, 
which approximate ‘willingness to pay’, may seem more sophisticated but suffer from 
the same problems of subjectivity (Komives et al., 2005). In addition, they require 
more data than are usually available from national household surveys.  
The estimates of affordability in this paper are therefore based on expenditure–
income ratios. In Zambia, expenditure on water by households without meters is 
equal to the fixed monthly charges applied by water companies. Figures were 
obtained from the regulator, NWASCO, for seven different regional utilities. Monthly 
water charges for low-cost housing are used in the calculations, since around 80 per 
cent of the urban population live in low-cost housing. The calculations were carried 
out for three different household categories in the urban areas, with data obtained 
from the Central Statistical Office (2004):  
a) households on different scales of income distribution   
b) households in moderate poverty 
c) households in extreme poverty. 
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Table 3. Affordability of Water Tariffs by Urban Households  (%)  
Urban 
Households 
(HH) by income 
decile 
Ratio of monthly water charges for low-cost housing to mean monthly household  income in the urban 
areas 
Lusaka 
Mulonga, 
Copperbelt Western 
AHC-MMS, 
Copperbelt Southern 
Nkana, 
Copperbelt Chipata 
1st (lowest 
income) 29.8 31.6 36 36.7 14.1 21.1 56.2 
2nd  13.6 14.4 16.4 16.7 6.4 9.6 25.6 
3rd  9 9.5 10.8 11.1 4.2 6.4 16.9 
4th  6.7 7.1 8.1 8.3 3.2 4.8 12.7 
5th  5.2 5.5 6.3 6.4 2.4 3.7 9.8 
6th  4 4.3 4.9 5 1.9 2.8 7.6 
7th  3 3.2 3.6 3.7 1.4 2.1 5.6 
8th  2.2 2.3 2.7 2.7 1 1.6 4.2 
9th  1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8 0.7 1 2.7 
10th (highest 
income) 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.8 
  Approximate proportion of the urban population for whom water is unaffordablea  
Using 5% 
benchmark   40  50  50  50 20  30 60 
Using 3% 
benchmark   60  60    60    60  30 40   70 
  Ratio of monthly water charges for low-cost housing to monthly mean household  income for:  
Extreme Poor 7.4 7.9 9 9.2 3.5 5.3 14 
Moderate Poor 5.2 5.6 6.3 6.5 2.5 3.7 9.9 
Note: 
a: These are rough estimates (approximations).  
Source: Based on income distribution data from Central Statistical Office (2004). Fixed monthly low-cost water charges were obtained from NWASCO for 
2002–03.  
Development and Change, Vol. 39, Issue 1, January 2008 
 
  
 
The results are presented in Table 3. Thus, for instance, a fixed monthly low-cost 
water charge applied by Lusaka Water and Sanitation Company in 2002–03 
constituted around 30 per cent of the average income of households in the first decile 
of income distribution (that is, those with the lowest incomes). In most urban centres, 
households at the lower end of the income distribution — up to the third decile — 
spend some 10 per cent or more of their average monthly income on water, with the 
exception of households in the Southern province and to some extent in Nkana in the 
Copperbelt. The calculation of the proportion of households in each decile in which 
monthly spending on water exceeds a benchmark of 5 per cent or 3 per cent of their 
average income provides us with an estimate of the rate of affordability of low-cost 
water charges.  
For example, using the 5 per cent benchmark, low-cost water charges in Lusaka 
were beyond the means of approximately 40 per cent of the urban population (the 
households in the first four deciles) in 2002–03. Using the 3 per cent benchmark 
yields an unaffordability rate of approximately 60 per cent. These estimates clearly 
show that affordability of even the lowest tariffs is a problem for urban households in 
Zambia. Overall, low cost tariffs constitute more than 5 per cent of household income 
for over 40 per cent of urban households, and more than 3 per cent of income for 
around 60–70 per cent of urban households, except for those in the Southern province 
and Nkana.  
In the final part of Table 3, the affordability of low-cost water charges is 
estimated for households in extreme and moderate poverty, using the mean household 
income for each category.11 These figures reveal that low-cost monthly payments 
account for above 3 per cent of the average incomes of poor households in both 
categories, except for those in the Southern province.12 In comparison, the estimates 
for lower deciles appear much higher than those for extreme and moderate poverty. 
This reflects the wide disparities in the income levels of the poor. 
                                                 
11 Extreme and moderate poverty lines are defined in Central Statistical Office (2004) as 
64,530 and 92,185 kwacha per month per person, respectively. 
12 Note that poverty in general affects around 68 per cent of the population. Around 38 per 
cent of households are in extreme poverty (Central Statistical Office, 2004). In 2002, the 
mean monthly income was 228,331 and 323,483 kwacha for extremely and moderately poor  
households, respectively. 
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Some caveats are in order here, to emphasize the fact that these estimates are far 
from being precise. First of all, low-cost housing may not always be occupied by poor 
households. Secondly, mean urban incomes in each decile in Table 3 reflect the 
Zambian average, but in some provinces (such as Lusaka and the Copperbelt) average 
urban household incomes are higher than the national average, while in others (such 
the Western and Eastern provinces) they are much lower. This may be considered a 
source of ‘estimation-bias’, leading to an over-estimation of the unaffordability rates 
for urban locations such as Lusaka and the Copperbelt. However, since around 80 per 
cent of the total population in each of these provinces is located in urban areas, and 
each province contains over one-third of the total urban population, urban income 
distribution data for Zambia is likely to be heavily influenced by the pattern of 
distribution in these provinces and a significant over-estimation of the rates of 
unaffordability is therefore unlikely.  
The results in Table 3, albeit imprecise, are revealing about the number of people 
in urban areas who experience difficulties in meeting the expense of one of the most 
essential of human needs, water. The results are even more interesting in a regional 
perspective. Zambia has some of the lowest water charges in sub-Saharan Africa — 
one reason why stakeholders in the water and sanitation sector push for further tariff 
rises. Hence, the Zambian case presents policy makers with a paradox. If the lowest 
water charges (those for low-cost housing) are unaffordable for a significant 
proportion of the population in Zambia, where average tariffs are already low in 
comparison to other countries in the region, it seems clear that the aspirations of cost 
recovery and extending access to water will not be achieved with the current strategy 
of reliance on tariff increases for generating funds for investment.  
 Metering may seem to offer a solution, since water charges for metered 
connections are lower for small users. This would not only lower the bills for 
households using up to 15 m3 of water per month, but also encourage all households 
to avoid wasteful use. Under the current system, price increases have no influence on 
the quantity of water used because most households are on fixed monthly tariffs. In 
other words, metering may also reduce the UFW levels. However, there are a number 
of factors that may reduce the feasibility and effectiveness of metering. First, 
interviews with sector specialists which were carried out during the fieldwork 
revealed that in some urban centres metering is not effective because water pressure 
is low and air in the pipes keeps meters running even when supply is interrupted. 
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Second, the cost of a meter13 is quite high for poor households to meet, unless 
subsidized or paid for in installments. Finally, as the number of connections with 
meters increases over time, the utilities may change their current pricing strategy and 
charge higher tariffs for measured consumption, thus eroding the welfare gains from 
metering for small users.  
 
 
Access to Safe Water in Urban Areas  
 
In Zambia, access to piped water has always been the privilege of the urban 
population along the narrow line of the railway from Livingstone to the Copperbelt. 
Because of economic decline and reduced capital spending in the sector, not much 
improvement could be made on the initial rates of urban access to water inherited at 
independence. In fact, data from different sources indicate that there has been 
deterioration in the access rates following the commercialization of the services, with 
some differences in the scale of decline. For example, according to the World Bank 
(2006), the proportion of the Zambian population with access to safe water declined 
from 73 per cent in 1990, before the start of commercialization, to 53 per cent in 
2005. According to the Zambia Demographic and Health Surveys (Central Statistical 
Office, various years), the fall in national access rates was slightly less, from 72.1 per 
cent in 1992 to 57 per cent in 2004. Prior to commercialization, urban population 
growth was much higher, so the fall in access rates is unlikely to be a reflection of an 
extraordinary increase in urban population. Rather, access rates have declined 
because of reduced capital spending in the sector, which will be discussed below.14  
The decline in overall urban access rates has been much less pronounced, going 
down from 93 per cent in 1992 to 90 per cent in 2002, as shown on the right-hand 
side of Table 4a. What is interesting is that data from the Zambia Demographic and 
Health Surveys (Central Statistical Office, various years) indicate a significant 
deterioration in the ‘quality of access’ to water, as reflected by the proportion of the 
urban population who lost their access to residential pipes and became dependent on 
public taps, wells and boreholes (around 25 per cent). In 2002, almost 40 per cent of 
                                                 
13 In 2004, the cost was equivalent to US$ 90. 
14 The annual growth rate for the urban population was in the range of 6–8 per cent in the 
1960s and 1970s, 3 per cent in the 1980s, and less than 2 per cent since the 1990s. 
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the urban population was supplied by commercial utilities, close to 10 per cent by 
local authorities and another 20 per cent by NGOs. The rest of the urban population 
relied on sources such as wells, rivers and ponds (MLGH, 2004).  
 
Table 4a. Access to Safe Water in Urban Areas (% of urban population)  
 
 1992 2002 
Total Urban Accessa 93 90.2 
Piped into residence 55 42 
Public taps 34 38 
Wells and boreholes   9 16 
Rivers, ponds, lakes etc.  2  4 
 
Note: 
a: Excludes water from unprotected wells, rivers, springs, streams, ponds and lakes. 
Source:  Central Statistical Office (various years).  
 
 
Table 4b. Access to Safe Water in Urban Areas from Commercial Utilities (% of urban 
population)  
 
Water Supply 
Companies 
Access Rates 
in  2005 
Change in Access 
Rates 2001–05 (%) 
Lusaka  79 13 
Copperbelt, former AHC- 
MMS (Mines) 92 –4 
Copperbelt, Nkana 62 33
Copperbelt, Mulonga 86 –5.5 
Copperbelt, Kafubu 93 11 
Southern 63 17 
Western 47 –57 
Northwestern 15 –52 
Chambeshi 39 n.a.
Chipata 69 –2.8 
Weighted Average 58 –21 
 
Source: NWASCO (2005). 
 
 
 
 The water supply and sanitation companies supplied on average 58 per cent of 
the population in their service area in 2005 (Table 4b). Access to water has been 
reasonably good and considerably above the average in the Copperbelt and Lusaka 
regions but not in other provinces. None of these utilities provide 24 hour continuous 
supply: the average daily flow of water was 16 hours in 2005 for medium and large 
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towns. Despite variations in the coverage of the population by different suppliers, the 
utility data clearly show that the process of commercialization not only failed to 
reverse the negative trend in access rates, but that access rates have declined by an 
average of more than 20 per cent since 2001.  
In Zambia, a considerable proportion of the urban population lives in unplanned 
settlements, or the so-called peri-urban areas. Water supply in these areas is a serious 
problem due to the well-known complexities associated with absence of legal titles to 
the land occupied by the households (Komives et al., 2005; UNDP, 2006). Most 
households in these areas depend on boreholes, communal or public taps built by 
commercial utilities, NGOs and donors. Various arrangements exist for the operation 
of such schemes: some are managed solely by communities, some are managed by 
communities in co-operation with public utilities and others are run by vendors 
(Dagdeviren, 2007). The small size of these schemes reduces the cost effectiveness of 
operations. Cash collection at water supply points is often problematic (World Bank, 
2003). 
The commercial suppliers in the formal sector are reluctant to provide water in 
these areas because the financial returns are negligible, while the independent supply 
systems set up by NGOs and donors suffer from serious capacity and management 
problems. Communities lack the capacity to deal with breakdowns and other sorts of 
supply failures. Public utilities are often brought in to tackle such problems. In 
Lusaka, for example, there are over thirty informal settlement areas, known locally as 
‘compounds’, where around 50 per cent of the capital’s population live. Half of the 
population in the compounds is served by Lusaka Water and Sanitation Company, 
mostly by public taps and to a lesser extent by individual yard taps. Lusaka WSC also 
reluctantly manages a number of water supply systems installed by NGOs. George 
Complex, for example, is one of the biggest compounds; here the water supply 
system has been provided by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Lusaka 
WSC is the manager of the water supply services in the compound and responsible 
for the collection of bills and maintenance (Dagdeviren, 2007).  
The quality of water in peri-urban areas is known to be poor. Ground water 
contamination through lack of proper sanitation facilities is part of the problem.  
Water supply in these areas is limited, often a few hours each in the morning and in 
the afternoon. There are also limits on the amount of water households can draw 
every day. Depending on the supply arrangement, a fixed fee is paid on either a daily 
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or a monthly basis. According to the World Bank (2002), some poorer households do 
not participate in water supply systems in the compounds but share the water cards of 
participating households, while others accumulate arrears or find sources of illegal 
supply.  
Access and water supply problems in peri-urban areas are currently receiving 
considerable attention because of the agenda set by the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). The response of the regulatory agency, NWASCO, to the MDG for 
water is to promote access in peri-urban areas through ‘water kiosks’ that are run by 
individual operators for a commission and maintained by the commercial utilities 
(NWASCO and DTF, 2005). This strategy is advocated for its feasibility in the 
medium term, as water kiosks involve low-cost technology and provide for an 
affordable service. The results are yet to be seen. While the urgency for access to safe 
water in unplanned settlements and the impetus given by the MDGs justifies such 
low-cost interventions, there are a number of reasons to be cautious. The kiosk 
concept is not radically different from existing systems, such as communal taps, 
whose commercial viability has been problematic. NWASCO recognizes this and 
suggests that the operators should be permitted to undertake other commercial 
activities at kiosks to supplement their income. It is not clear who would shoulder the 
cost of maintenance: commercial utilities, operators or users? The answer to this 
question has further implications for the viability of this option in the long-term.  
 
 
TO INVEST OR NOT TO INVEST: A RE-ASSESSMENT  
 
The literature on utility services provides ample evidence of the importance of 
investment for the performance of utility companies, the efficiency of their operations 
and the future security of supply in meeting increasing demand for basic services. For 
the power sector, Hirschhausen et al. (2004), Neuho and de Vries (2004), and Woo et 
al. (2003) all highlight the inadequacies of market-based solutions in maintaining 
required investments and adequate levels of production capacity. Chisari et al. (2003) 
note that even with regulation and related pricing systems (price caps or cost-plus 
approaches) there is often too little or too much investment. Hence, he stresses the 
importance of ‘planning’ for the current and future security of supply of utility 
services. Evidence from the water sector similarly shows that the lack of adequate 
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investment makes a crucial difference in performance (Alcazar et al., 2002; Beddies 
et al., 2004; Shaoul, 1997). 
Public sector utilities can be efficient in many respects (affordability, high 
revenue generation, cost recovery, service reliability, resource conservation) as long 
as they involve sufficient levels of investment with long-term planning. This point 
has been amply demonstrated by successful public utilities such as NamWater in 
Namibia and ONEA in Burkina Faso (Bayliss, 2003); EMOS in Santiago, Chile 
(Shirley et al., 2002); public water suppliers in Korca, Albania  (Beddies et al., 2004);  
ESCOM in South Africa and NamPower in Namibia (Eberhardt et al., 2005). 
In Zambia, one of the important reasons behind the commercialization process’s 
failure to turn its stated objectives into reality is that it has become a means for the 
government to relinquish its responsibility for investment in the sector. Lack of 
investment during the fiscal austerity of the 1980s continued into the 1990s when, 
under the pretext of commercialization, government transfers to the water sector for 
investment were almost entirely eliminated (NWASCO, 2003).  
Much of the existing water infrastructure in Zambia was built in the 1970s. The 
donor grants or loans provided to some water and sanitation companies at the start of 
the commercialization process were not sufficient to fully rehabilitate the existing 
networks, except for Chipata where investments were funded by the German 
technical development organization, GTZ.  This explains why Chipata had the lowest 
UFW (26 per cent) and the highest cost coverage rate (91 per cent) in the sector in 
2006 (NWASCO, 2006). Lack of investment in the sector has serious implications for 
the future sustainability of services. The Lusaka WSC, for example, has made no 
major investment in recent years. It had a water production capacity of 220 million 
litres per day in 2002, far below the estimated 300 million litres per day aggregate 
demand for water that year. The water network is more than thirty years old (Lusaka 
WSC, 2002) and some pipes in the city’s sewer network are more than forty years old 
(PANA, 2004). 
The Water Supply and Sanitation Development Group prepared a medium-term 
development strategy for the government to implement during 1994–2003. Their 
estimations suggested that the government had to invest between US$ 407 million (a 
low-cost investment strategy) and US$ 1,553 million (a medium-cost investment 
strategy) every year during this period in order to rehabilitate the existing system and 
expand the network to avoid any reduction in access rates. In other words, the 
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government did not plan to extend access to safe water in Zambia in this period, but it 
did aim to maintain the existing infrastructure and population coverage. 
 
 
Table 5. Expenditure in Water and Sanitation Sector, 1998–2002  
 
 
Government Capital Expenditure
Total 
Spending by 
Donors and 
NGOs (US$ 
million) 
Actual expenditure as % of  
required capital expenditurea  
Budget 
(B) US$ 
million 
Actual 
(A) US$ 
million 
A/B 
(%) 
Low cost 
scenario 
Medium cost 
scenario 
1998 12.1 0.4 3.1 36 8.9 2.4 
1999 7.4 0.2 2.4 45 11 2.9 
2000 3.4 0.1 3 28 6.9 1.8 
2001 3.5 0.4 12.3 31 7.7 2 
2002 6.1 0.5 8.8 33 8.2 2.2 
 
Note: 
a: Capital expenditure required to rehabilitate existing facilities and network, and to expand  
the network to avoid any reduction in the access rate. Actual expenditure is the sum of capital 
expenditure by the government and total expenditure by the donors and NGOs. 
Source: Estimated using data from Ministry of Local Government and Housing (2004). 
 
 
In reality, capital spending in the water and sanitation sector by the government 
during this period represented a small fraction of the required investments, as shown 
in Table 5.  In 1987, the government had invested US$ 16.6 million in the sector 
(MoD, 1988), thirty times more than the amount spent in 2002. From 1998 to 2002, 
the government invested between 2 and 12 per cent of its budgeted capital spending 
for the water and sanitation sector. NGOs and donors spent between US$ 30 million 
and US$ 45 million in total during the same time period.15 Even if we assume that all 
spending by donors and NGOs went into capital formation in the sector (which is 
unlikely) and add this amount to the actual capital spending undertaken by the 
government, the total sums come nowhere near to the required annual investments as 
shown in Table 5.  
Government funding of capital expenditure in both the rural and urban water 
supply systems was US$ 0.63 million in 2004. At this rate, the MDG for water is 
unlikely to be achieved in Zambia because even the most modest estimates based on 
                                                 
15 Note that the investments undertaken by the commercial utilities were funded either by 
donors or the government. Investments by local authority suppliers (if any are undertaken), 
are funded by the government.   
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quick fix solutions, such as the extension of water supply coverage through 
communal taps (especially kiosks), suggest that around Euros 20 million is needed to 
meet the MDG target for water (NWASCO and DTF, 2005).  
All utilities in urban Zambia now require further increases in tariffs to enhance 
their performance and services. A superficial analysis might suggest that higher prices 
would boost their revenues and help them to invest more. But higher tariffs do not 
necessarily mean higher revenues: in Zambia, prior to corporatization and 
commercialization, the local authority suppliers were able to cover a higher 
proportion of their operational and maintenance costs on the basis of much lower 
tariffs than have been applied by the current utilities. Other studies have revealed 
similar findings (Roe et al., 2003; World Bank, 2003). 
Given the evidence on declining access to water and the unaffordability of low 
water tariffs for a considerable portion of urban households, the commercialization of 
water services seems destined to be a failure without up-front investment. 
Investments in repairs, maintenance and network extension are likely to cut down the 
costs of production and distribution significantly through reduced UFW rates, which 
stood at around 50 per cent of the total water produced on average in the urban sector 
in 2005 (see Table 1). Notwithstanding the need to reduce the amount of water 
wasted by residential users, an important cause of high UFW levels is the poor state 
of infrastructure, which is likely to be putting upward pressure on unit production 
costs. Expansion of the network through new investments can also lower the average 
cost of production and improve the access of the population to safe water. 
The ultimate question is how to finance investment in the water sector. Although 
this question requires further research, the discussion so far points to the funds raised 
by the public sector (both national and international) as the prime source for financing 
investment in low-income economies. The evidence in high income economies 
supports this view. For example, OECD countries provide substantial grants for 
financing capital expenditure in the water sector. In some cases, the public sector 
provides the full funding for such expenditure (Komives et al., 2005). In France, the 
government fund one-third of the capital expenditure of the private water companies 
(Dore et al., 2004). Taking account of the scale of funds required for service 
extension and maintenance, and the revenue limitations of low-income country 
governments, development assistance by donor countries has to be an important 
source of funding.  
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
Management and operation of water and sanitation services in the developing world 
are increasingly being commercialized. While reforms for improving service 
provision are welcome, it is important to focus on the compatibility of the means and 
ends in the process of implementation. The objective of achieving cost recovery in the 
provision of water supply services can be a means to increase the proportion of the 
population with access to safe water. With an inappropriate policy mix, the 
aspirations for cost recovery can also lead to the opposite result of declining access 
rates.  
In general, reforms can target progress in three areas. The first involves reducing 
operational inefficiencies, for example by changing systems of management and 
organizational structure, reducing overstaffing, improving billing and revenue 
collection. The second entails addressing investment needs in the sector to reduce the 
cost of production and distribution through improved use of economies of scale and 
reduced UFW. The third requires increasing the tariff levels and changing the pricing 
structure to generate more revenue. In determining the composition of reforms, 
household incomes, poverty levels and the scale of investment needed in 
infrastructure should all be taken into account.  
 In Zambia, tariff increases have been at the centre of the commercialization 
process for cost recovery. Cuts in capital expenditure and measures to improve 
operational efficiency have also been part of the process. The reforms have been 
ineffective and the outcomes rather disappointing in some important areas. Despite 
the variation in performance across the ten commercial utilities, most are still far from 
achieving cost recovery. Their tariffs are low but nonetheless unaffordable to the 
majority. Quality of access to safe water in the urban sector has declined since the 
beginning of commercialization; more households now rely on public taps, boreholes 
and wells rather than water supply through residential pipes. 
The strategy of getting prices right to achieve cost recovery (when the costs are 
already inflated due to poor infrastructure and the small size of the network) and 
improve the water network has been tried with little success. It is now time for up-
front public investment in the extension of the network and renewal of the 
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infrastructure to reach cost recovery in the sector, with affordable tariffs through 
reductions in unit costs and levels of unaccounted for water. Without this, there seems 
little chance of breaking out of the cycle of low investment, weak infrastructure, poor 
revenue collection and low levels of access to water and sanitation services. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 Table A1. Monthly Residential Water Tariffs (Kwacha, constant prices) 
 
 
Fixed tariffs for unmetered 
connections by housing category  
Tariffs for metered 
connections for: 
 
Low 
cost  Medium cost High cost  
6 m3 
water 
15 m3 
water 
30 m3 
water 
1990 22.0 65.9 65.9 – – – 
1992 83.7 125.5 167.4  8.4 8.4 12.6 
1994 95.5 167.1 300.9  – – – 
 
Tariffs of Selected Commercial Utilities in 2002 
Lusaka 114.3 183.0 643.7  16.2 45.3 93.8 
AHC-
MMSa 140.8 226.4 303.1  18.6 59.8 142.7 
Nkana 80.9 134.8 242.6  20.2 50.5 121.3 
Southern 53.9 80.9 141.5  18.2 60.6 158.4 
Western 138.1 239.2 239.2  57.3 57.3 113.9 
 
Tariffs of Selected Commercial Utilities in 2006  
Lusaka 123.6 256.7 613.6  21.3 59.7 123.6 
Nkanaa 69.2 115.4 248.6  21.3 56.5 122.2 
Southern 71.0 106.5 170.5  21.3 53.3 110.1 
Western 177.6 – 230.8  21.3 58.1 127.3 
 
Note: 
a:  The management contract of AHC-MMS was terminated in 2005 and the utility was taken 
 over by Nkana WSC. 
 
Sources: Tariff data for the 1990s from Ministry of Energy and Water Development;  
data for 2002 and 2006 from NWASCO. Figures are deflated by CPI index.  
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